DEFINING A NEW ETHICAL STANDARD FOR HUMAN IN VITRO
EMBRYOS IN THE CONTEXT OF STEM CELL RESEARCH
This iBrief discusses some of the social, ethical and legal considerations
surrounding the use of unimplanted, in vitro embryos in stem cell
research. It proposes that a new ethical standard be elucidated for these
embryos. The iBrief gives an overview of two proposals for such a
standard at opposite ends of the spectrum: treating the in vitro embryo
as a legal person versus treating it as mere property. It argues against
both approaches. The former can have undesirable social implications
including undue interference with female reproductive autonomy, while
the latter would objectify potential human life and reproductive
potential. The iBrief proposes an intermediate approach that treats the
embryo as a special entity. It warns against a model whereby the respect
accorded to embryos is made dependent on the attainment of various
qualitative or developmental criteria. The complexities surrounding
human life, it argues, are too uncertain. What is certain is the embryo's
unique potential for human life, at any developmental stage. This, the
iBrief proposes, should be the sole criterion for an embryo's special
status, a status that should be confined within constitutional limits.

I. INTRODUCTION
Research on embryonic stem cells has generated passionate social debate. Many in the
scientific community believe that stem cell-based therapies can one day treat many physical
human ailments. The extraction of embryonic stem cells for research, however, involves the
destruction of the human embryo. This has led to many debates about if and when this research
can be ethically justified. Many countries are now struggling to establish principles to guide
research in this sensitive field.
In developing these principles, it is important to elucidate a new ethical standard
regarding the status of the human embryo. Previous judicial and legal debates have generated
rules and principles that relate to unborn children.

This is contextually different from the

situation of laboratory-generated in vitro embryos that have an independent physical existence.
Different views regarding the status of the embryo in this context range from regarding it as a
person to regarding it as mere property. This paper examines these views and proposes an
intermediate approach that treats the embryo as a special entity. This approach is meant to
incorporate various considerations, including the medical benefits of stem cell research, the
sanctity of potential human life, and the need to respect female reproductive autonomy.

II. DIFFERENT ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR DEFINING THE HUMAN
EMBRYO
The embryo as a person
At one extreme of the spectrum of possible legal protections for the embryo lies the view
that the embryo constitutes a legal person from the moment of conception. Proponents of this
view rely on various scientific and philosophical explanations to reinforce their position.
Scientifically, it is at conception that a biological entity is created with a genome distinct from
that of either parent. That genome encodes all the genetic information necessary to create a new,
unique, adult human individual. Conception is also what initiates the complex and mysterious
series of biological events that characterize embryonic development and that culminate in the
creation of a living, human individual.
It is both infeasible and inappropriate, the argument continues, for opponents of this view
to try to gauge the different stages of embryonic development in terms of some order of
importance.

Instead, life is more appropriately viewed as a continuum that exists from

conception until death. “At every stage, it is, and remains from beginning to end, the same life,
by whatever name it may be described–whether a zygote, an embryo, a fetus, a baby, a child, an
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infant, a toddler, a teenager, an adult or a geriatric.”

It would be morally unjustifiable to deny

legal personhood to any of these stages or, indeed, to any category of human life. To do so is
analogous to the historical denials of personhood to slaves and women, acts that are now accepted
to have been both unacceptable and immoral.
As legal persons, it follows that human embryos ought not to be the subjects of scientific
research that is aimed at benefiting anyone other than the embryos themselves. Just as it is
immoral to experiment on adult human subjects for the advancement of medicine, so too is
experimenting on embryos. It is true that most of the embryos that will be used in this research
will likely come from the surplus that is created during fertility treatments and so are destined for
destruction anyway. However, an imminent death does not create a license to subject one to
2

lethal experimentation. The organs of U.S. death-row inmates, for example, cannot be harvested
without their consent.
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Some jurisdictions appear to be adopting a legal model that views the embryo as a
person. In Louisiana, for example, laws have been passed declaring that non-implanted embryos
are juridical persons that cannot be intentionally destroyed and that have full civil rights to sue or
be sued.
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However, there can be a number of problems with such a legal model. Biologically, a
young embryo can, at a very young age, split into two or more twins (a process known as
“twinning”). This is possible because the stem cells it is comprised of at this age are extremely
unspecialized, therefore having unlimited developmental potential.

Is it sensible to argue,

therefore, that every one of these early stem cells ought to be considered a person?
There are also numerous social implications to treating embryos as persons.

Their

termination or disposal, even for fertility treatments, would become tantamount to homicide.
Moreover, it might be difficult to limit the application of legal personhood of the embryo to the in
vitro context. Once this line is crossed, there may be pressure to treat all embryos according to
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the “best interests of the child” rule in all contexts. This could have profound consequences for
women’s reproductive autonomy. It is therefore important to examine other legal models for
application to in vitro embryos.

The embryo as property
At the opposite extreme is the view that the young in vitro embryo is a form of biological
property. Such a position would include embryos within some or all of the bundle of property
rights (e.g. alienability rights) that society already recognizes in certain biological products,
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including blood, hair, urine, semen, ova and certain tissues. Essentially, this view holds that the
embryo is little more than a collection of cells that can be freely donated for research or other
purposes. In the prenatal context, such embryos (or fetuses) are seen as mere appendages of the
mother, no different from any other body part. As such, prenatal remains need not be given any
special treatment following therapeutic or elective abortions, for example, and can be discarded
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like any other surgical by-product.
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To view the in vitro embryo as property likely means that it will be the parents-donors of
those gametes that gave rise to the embryo in whom the property rights will be vested. This gives
rise to a host of complex legal issues, including which of the two parents can claim custody over
the in vitro embryo, or the legal effect of any transfer of decisional authority over the embryo
(e.g. upon donation). Such issues have been the topic of much litigation, particularly in the
United States, and are largely beyond the scope of this paper.
What remain relevant, however, are the many social considerations that influence
whether or not it is desirable to view the embryo as property. As mentioned earlier, there is
concern that any step beyond the property model towards ascribing any rights to the
embryo/fetus, in whatever context, will unduly interfere with female reproductive rights. Access
to abortion could become strongly limited, pregnant women may become more restricted in the
lifestyle choices they make and pregnancy might be transformed into a contest of competing
rights.
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Those who maintain that it is legitimate to treat the embryo as property also dismiss the
analogy that is frequently drawn between their position and slavery. They note that there is an
important distinction between ownership rights in one’s own body or products of one’s own body
and those in the body of another. Moreover, it could be argued that an absolute protection of the
right of women to control their own bodies (in the same way that men can) actually helps affirm
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the value of personhood as a concept by providing people with the fullest personal autonomy.

At the same time, critics of this view warn strongly against the dangers of treating any
aspect of human life as property. Many argue, again, that there is a fine line between outright
ownership of adult human beings (i.e. slavery), and granting property rights in any other form of
human life, or even potential human life. The fact that gametes and embryos implicate very
personal concerns, given their roles in human reproduction, should also make their
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commodification questionable.

Moreover, the potential of embryos to develop into complete human beings distinguishes
them fundamentally from other biological products in which property rights have already been
ascribed. This is in addition to the fact that courts already show some hesitation in granting
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property interests in the human body.
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Hence, many scholars believe that some alternative status
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is more appropriate for defining the in vitro embryo, one that lies between the two extremes of
viewing the embryo as either a person, or as mere property.

The embryo as a special entity
An intermediate view would confer a type of legal protection that takes into account the
embryo’s unique and special quality of being a potential source of human life. Indeed, some
courts in the U.S. have explicitly adopted such a position. In Davis v. Davis, a divorce case
involving a custody battle over young frozen embryos, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that
frozen embryos are neither persons nor property, “but occupy an interim category that entitles
them to special respect because of their potential for human life.”
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Such special respect would

be equally warranted in the context of stem cell research.
A possible way of defining the “interim category” that covers in vitro embryos is by
employing the legal concept of “quasi-property.” This concept is already in use. For example, it
has helped in defining the rights of treatment over a corpse by the next-of-kin.
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It has also been

used by courts in some jurisdictions to help define a mother’s rights over her stillborn fetus.
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Applied to an in vitro embryo, such a concept may help establish a useful compromise: the
property rights ascribed need not be so absolute as to constitute complete ownership over the
embryo (and its potential for human life), but can be extensive enough to safeguard reproductive
freedom concerns.
An important debate arising here is whether the proposed special status that is to be
conferred upon the embryo should remain static from conception through further stages of
embryonic development. Much of the popular literature in this field either assumes that it should
not or recognizes the prevalence of this assumption.
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The model frequently presented is one
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whereby greater protection is ascribed to the embryo as it develops and matures. This literature is
also replete with discussions as to what criteria are to be used in determining those fundamental
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developmental stages that trigger entitlement to greater legal protection.

Some of these criteria

are quantitative, based on physical changes including, inter alia, such major biological
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developments as differentiation, nervous system development and brain wave generation.

Others are qualitative, based on more subjective characteristics that are somewhat difficult to
define, including sentience, consciousness and self-consciousness, self-motivated activity and the
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ability to reason.

The idea of using such criteria is popular and may even appear to have a basis in logic. It
seems reasonable, after all, that the more the fetus matures and resembles a fully developed
human being, the more capable it is of becoming a subject of legal protection. This approach has
also found judicial acceptance, most notably in Roe v. Wade,
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the U.S. Supreme Court decision

that partially legalized non-therapeutic abortions. Justice Blackmun in Roe, writing for the Court,
identified viability to be the “compelling” point after which a state would be permitted to legislate
in the interest of protecting fetal life, even to the extent of proscribing abortion altogether (except
where necessary to protect the mother’s health).
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Viability can be defined as the point after

which a fetus will be able to exist on its own. The Court noted that such legislation would have
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“both logical and biological justifications.”

However, an adoption of an “incrementalist” approach to determining an embryo’s
entitlement to state protection can be replete with difficulties. In terms of legal practice, it
essentially means that the embryo would, with development, become less and less like property
and more and more like a person. Stated as such, it seems that what is really being applied here is
not a separate legal model for the embryo; rather, it is a blend of the two extreme positions
described earlier, with all the social and legal difficulties they entailed. This may hardly be a
satisfactory course to help in determining the embryo’s legal status.
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The proposed criteria to be used in such an analysis are also far from being reliable. For
example, how can such qualitative characteristics as self-consciousness or reasoning be
measured? What about cases of anaesthetized or comatose patients, who do not sense pain and
lack self-awareness, but are still considered persons? Will it be possible to clearly define the
limits of application for such criteria?
Other criteria are almost entirely dependent on technology.

This includes the U.S.

approach of determining viability, as put forth by the Court in Roe, supra. The point of viability
is constantly being pushed back by technological developments such that if artificial wombs are
ever created, an embryo may theoretically be able to survive in vitro from the moment of its
conception. Clearly, many of the criteria proposed for measuring the embryo’s moral worth are
ill defined and devoid of certainty at least.
That which is certain is the embryo’s potential for human life. That fact alone can serve
as a sound basis for the embryo’s proposed special status. To otherwise determine that status on
the basis of vague, intangible criteria is problematic. It will essentially result in an exercise of
defining human life according to those factors (given that it is the respect for human life that will
have prompted society to seek a special status for the embryo). The problem is that such an
exercise is, in all likelihood, beyond human capability. Put differently, it is inaccurate and
perhaps even hubristic to suggest that the concept of life is, at least at present, within our realm of
understanding. To try to compartmentalize it according to a hierarchical system that relies on
qualitative criteria that are themselves vague and difficult to characterize is unhelpful.
Moreover, such a simplification can lead to undesired social consequences. It makes the
value of human life dependent upon the possession of certain mental or physical qualities. This
can have significant implications for those members of society who lack or have a diminished
possession of those qualities. This would include, inter alia, the terminally ill, the mentally
handicapped, and the elderly. The potential harm that may arise from these implications may be
mitigated by the fact that such people are already recognized as legal persons.

Still, any

suggestion that their lives may be less worthy of protection than the lives of those with full
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possession of purportedly “life-defining” qualities is worrisome and repugnant to our society.

There are also no clear ethical reasons why the absence of certain developmental criteria
should make some embryos less morally relevant than others. After all, the value of the human
entity can be said to be greater than the sum of its parts. That entity as a whole may mature to
develop such properties as sentience or certain physical structures with time. However, its
21
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intrinsic worth remains unchanged.
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Thus, a better legal model for the in vitro embryo may be

one that operates on the basic premise that the intrinsic value of potential human life is to be
respected, and is deserving of legal protection. Such an approach would also avoid many of the
pitfalls and social dangers outlined above.
A legal focus on protecting human life per se would mean, by extension, that such
protection ought to be conferred upon any form that either embodies, or at least has the potential
to embody human life. Included would be in vitro embryos, regardless of their age or any another
developmental criteria. Of course, the extent of such protection would still need to be confined to
within constitutional limits.

Challenging the embryo/pre-embryo distinction
One moral distinction that is frequently drawn is between embryos that are younger and
older than fourteen days. Recall that this is the age marking the development of the primitive
streak, along which the major tissues and organs of the body differentiate. The term pre-embryo
is now commonly used to refer to the young, pre-fourteen day old embryo. Certain governments
have sanctioned this embryo/pre-embryo distinction. In the United Kingdom, for example, the
embryonic age of fourteen days has been set as the upper limit for which government funds for
embryo research are available.
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In Canada, some influential organizations and a Royal

Commission have recommended that the federal government introduce legislation that does the
same.
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In the United States, some courts have cited the pre-embryo/embryo distinction. In
Davis, supra, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court accepted the testimony of scientific
experts who outlined the distinction: “…[A]t the [pre-embryo] stage, the developmental

singleness of one person has not been established…The first cellular
differentiation…relates to physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the
establishment of the embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the
developing entity up to this point as a pre-embryo, rather than an embryo.”25 Indeed, it is
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widely accepted in scientific circles that there is no possibility that feeling, experience or any of
the other proposed criteria for evaluating the embryo’s moral status could exist in the pre-embryo.
As was explained earlier, however, these criteria are relevant only insofar as such values
as sentience or consciousness are considered to be of special moral significance. This consensus
does not exist. It is also somewhat misleading to suggest that individuality takes hold only at the
onset of differentiation. It is at conception, after all, when all the genetic information necessary
to create a distinct human individual is attained. This genetic code remains fixed and unchanged
throughout the development of the embryo. Also, the creation of twins, triplets, etc. at the preembryo stage can be characterized as little more than a resetting of the embryo’s biological clock,
26

such that it repeats cleavages that it had previously underwent.

There are also practical difficulties associated with adopting the fourteen-day distinction.
For example, a certain level of uncertainty is associated with attempts to establish the age of an
embryo in days. Measurements are often inaccurate to within a few days.
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This means that the

fourteen-day measure is, at least at present, ambiguous and therefore an unreliable standard to
assist in determining the embryo’s legal status. Much safer, again, is an approach that protects an
embryo simply because of its potential for human life. Such an approach would not discriminate
between any in vitro embryos, all of which are endued with that same potential from the moment
of their conception and are therefore entitled to some legal protection on that basis alone.

“Spare” versus “research” embryos
While some distinctions have been drawn between embryos based on different
developmental criteria, another important distinction is based on the underlying purpose behind
the creation of an embryo. Many hold the view that experimenting on embryos that have been
created specifically for purposes of research is more morally problematic than research on
embryos created for other, less objectionable purposes, including fertility treatments.
Fertility treatment procedures typically involve the creation of extra embryos to increase
the chances of a successful pregnancy. The “surplus” embryos, if not used for other purposes, are
typically discarded. However, the broader intention of such practices is the creation of a viable,
healthy child. Hence, it has been argued that research on those “spare” embryos left over from
fertility treatments is more morally acceptable than research on embryos that have been created
with the prior intention of destroying them via research practices.

To create embryos for

research, the argument goes, would be to treat the embryo as a mere instrument in the quest for
26
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knowledge. This would be inconsistent with the respect to which an embryo is entitled as a
source of human life.
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Many do not accept that even research on spare embryos is morally permissible.

They

question the validity of the distinction between spare and research embryos. Both, after all, are
equally capable of human life, and no difference exists in their moral status qua embryo, or in
their ultimate fate. Thus, if research is not permissible for one, it should similarly be prohibited
for the other. Such thinkers also feel that it is inaccurate to suggest that spare embryos will be
discarded anyway, even if not experimented on. They note that these embryos can potentially be
adopted and implanted into women who either desire pregnancy, or wish to act on the embryo’s
behalf.
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Others, however, maintain that it is simply deceptive to believe that the many thousands
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of embryos that are currently stored in a cryopreserved state will ever be implanted.

To bar

potentially beneficial medical research from being conducted on them would, they argue, be an
enormous waste. Indeed, the medical potential of embryonic stem cell research, with its potential
to save lives, is seen by many as sufficient justification for research on not only spare embryos,
but also embryos that are created specifically for research purposes.
Research embryos may also provide many additional research benefits compared to spare
embryos. For example, the eggs and sperm selected to create them can be young and viable, as
opposed to those embryos from fertility centers that tend to originate from older, infertile
couples.
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Certain aspects of stem cell research may also require the use of research embryos as a

practical necessity. For example, some studies in cell maturation processes require the deliberate
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fertilization of eggs as part of the experimentation.

In 2001, researchers at the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine at the Eastern
Virginia Medical School became the first to create human embryos for the specific purpose of
harvesting their stem cells.
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Now that this line has been crossed, all that is left is for legislators

to decide whether or not this practice should be legal on ethical and public policy grounds.
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III. CONCLUSION
Embryonic stem cell research holds both the promise of medical benefits, and the
dilemma of embryo research and destruction.

Capitalizing on the benefits will require a

clarification of the legal status of the embryo, and the adoption of clear ethical standards and
guidelines for embryo research. One possible legal model is to treat the embryo as a person.
This, however, can have significant implications for female reproductive autonomy. Adopting a
legal model that treats the human embryo as mere property assuages such concerns. But this fails
to accord the embryo any respect as a source of human life. An intermediate position would hold
that the embryo is a special entity entitled to special respect.
Some argue that the measure of this respect should be varied depending on the attainment
of certain biological characteristics or other abstract criteria of “personhood.” Assessing such
criteria, however, will be difficult and runs the risk of compartmentalizing certain aspects of
human life in an overly simplistic fashion. To base this special status in the embryo's unique
potential for human life appears to be a preferable approach. Given the important ethical, health
and social issues that embryonic stem cell research implicates, it is essential that countries
establish an effective policy with respect to this technology. Outlining a new legal standard for
the human in vitro embryo would be one step toward achieving this.
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